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 THE NEW DEAL
 'CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION'
 AS AN HISTORICAL PROBLEM
 By EDWARD A. PURCELL JR.
 The past quarter century has witnessed a major shift in the structures of American politics, often characterized as the passing of "the New Deal order." G. Edward White's superb
 new book The Constitution and the New Deal is a monument to that
 sea change, a clear-eyed effort to assess the significance of the New
 Deal and its iconic "constitutional revolution" from a self-consciously
 removed perspective that regards the New Deal as truly "past" and its
 well-established historiography as largely apologetic. Most prior
 accounts of the New Deal and its "constitutional revolution," White
 tells us, are "triumphalist narratives" that have had a "powerful and
 distorting historiographical effect."
 White's clearly written and cogently reasoned book is a pleasure to
 read, but its ambition and complexity make it a challenge to review.
 Although on one level it has a quite narrow focus, the book
 nevertheless involves many issues and carries a variety of implica
 tions, not all of which White spells out or explores in detail.
 Its narrowness comes from the way it conceives its ostensible
 subject. The Constitution and the New Deal does not inquire into the
 complex, shifting, and interactive relationship that existed between
 its two titled elements. Rather, it focuses instead on a single
 well-known question: did the election of 1936 and, especially, the
 "Court-packing" plan that President Franklin Roosevelt announced
 the following February "cause" the Supreme Court to change its
 interpretations of the Constitution in the spring of 1937?
 The book's breadth and ambition, in contrast, come from the fact
 that its true subject is not the Constitution and the New Deal as such
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 but rather the evolution of American jurisprudence, the nature of
 constitutional law, and the power of preconceptions to distort legal
 and historical analysis. In exploring these themes the book operates
 on at least six intertwined levels. It is a history of numerous
 constitutional changes that occurred during the first half of the 20th
 century; a study of the relationship between those changes and the
 New Deal "constitutional revolution"; an intellectual history of "the
 conventional account" of that relationship as it evolved over the
 remainder of the 20th century; a broad reinterpretation of that
 relationship which "minimizes the significance of the New Deal"
 while stressing the central importance of "modernity"; a largely
 implicit critique of recent work in "normative" constitutional history
 for abusing the past to serve contemporary political purposes; and a
 general argument about the causal role of the law's "internal"
 categories and doctrines as opposed to the "external" pressures that
 society places on law.
 II
 The "conventonal account," White explains, contends that the New
 Deal inaugurated a "new era of constitutional law and constitutional
 interpretation." This "new era" involved a substantial expansion of
 governmental power, especially at the national level, and a new kind
 of "bifurcated" judicial review that called for "deferential" scrutiny of
 government economic regulations and "aggressive" scrutiny of gov
 ernment actions impinging upon civil rights and liberties. In addition,
 it embraced a new "modernist" jurisprudence that conceived of
 Supreme Court justices "not as apolitical savants discerning the
 essentialist principles of the Constitution but as political actors with
 their own ideological agendas."
 Challenging that "conventional account," the book pivots on its
 reexamination of a narrowly defined "causal" issue. "At the core of
 the conventional narrative," it declares, "is a group of events, taking
 place within a relatively short time span, which have been invested
 with causal prominence and whose ramifications have been assumed
 to extend backward and forward over a considerable range of time."
 As the account runs, between 1934 and 1936 the Supreme Court's
 opposition to the New Deal's program of national economic régula
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 tion created a titanic confrontation, but the election of 1936 and
 Roosevelt's Court-packing plan ultimately pressured the justices to
 abandon their prior views and remold the Constitution to accommo
 date the New Deal.
 White adopts two strategies to disprove that causal connection.
 First, in four successive chapters he examines early 20th-century
 developments in the law of foreign relations, administrative agencies,
 and free speech. Those constitutional areas "lie somewhere on the
 periphery of the conventional narrative's focus," White acknowl
 edges, but he begins with them because the "most ambitious
 versions" of the "conventional account" have "tended to posit a
 constitutional revolution that swept through all areas of constitutional
 law in the wake of the New Deal and the Court-packing crisis." The
 chapters on the law of foreign relations and administrative agencies,
 in particular, provide fresh and insightful analyses of major jurispru
 dential areas that have too often been ignored or treated with little
 historical sophistication. Together, the chapters demonstrate con
 vincingly that major changes were well underway in all three areas
 before the arrival of the New Deal and certainly before the election
 of 1936. Further, they show that most of the doctrinal changes in the
 three areas were not finalized during the years from 1937 to 1943 but
 rather continued to take shape through the late 1940's and beyond.
 Hence, the New Deal neither "caused" most of the basic doctrinal
 changes nor cast the law into any final "New Deal" form.
 White's second strategy of critique is confession and avoidance,
 and he uses it to address those issues "at the very center of the
 conventional account." He readily admits that the Court made
 "revolutionary" changes in constitutional "political economy" doc
 trines. "[0]nly an eccentric student of Contract, Commerce, and Due
 Process Clause decisions between 1933 and 1943," he writes, "would
 deny that the Court significantly altered its doctrinal posture in those
 areas." What White seeks to avoid is the claim that those changes
 were "caused" by political pressures created by the New Deal.
 White summarizes the evidence against the election and Court
 packing thesis in the political economy cases and quickly terms it
 "discredited." Drawing on the illuminating work of Barry Cushman,
 Richard Friedman, and others, he points, for example, to the fact that
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 two of the Court's most innovative decisions—Nebbia v. New York
 and Home Building 6- Loan Association v. Blaisdell—came down in
 1934, that the Court reached its critical 1937 decision in West Coast
 Hotel v. Parrish before Roosevelt announced the Court-packing plan,
 and that the Court did not make its most sweeping changes until the
 early 1940's, long after Court-packing had been abandoned and at a
 time when "the composition of the Court bore almost no resem
 blance to its composition in the 1936 Term."
 White then offers an alternate explanation for the Court's admitted
 doctrinal changes. Drawing heavily on Cushman's work, he maintains
 that the Court's decisions in 1937 and afterward were the result of a
 "gradual disintegration, in place since the 1920s, of the integrity of
 the orthodox judicial doctrines and formulas." Indeed, for Cushman
 and White, it was the Court's 1934 decision in Nebbia that was truly
 "pivotal." Nebbia marked the "unravelling" of established due process
 doctrine and logically paved the way for the drastic changes that
 followed in the "political economy" cases.
 Structurally, White's "doctrinal disintegration" thesis concerning
 the "political economy" cases parallels his initial argument based on
 the three "peripheral" constitutional areas of foreign relations,
 administrative law, and free speech. Both lines of argument coincide
 to show that pathbreaking changes which subsequently became
 associated with the New Deal were, in fact, well underway long
 before 1932.
 To understand the significance of White's book, it is important to
 recognize the way that it minimizes two other theses about the
 relationship between the New Deal and the "constitutional revolu
 tion." One stresses the profound crisis created by the Great Depres
 sion and the popular and unprecedented efforts of the New Deal to
 respond. This thesis suggests that those compelling circumstances
 may well have influenced one or more of the justices who inaugu
 rated the "constitutional revolution" in 1937—most likely Chief
 Justice Charles Evans Hughes and especially Justice Owen J. Rob
 erts—and nudged them toward doctrinal interpretations that would
 approve the new governmental activism. While White would likely
 acknowledge those conditions as contributing factors, he would insist
 on their subsidiary significance. If the doctrinal basis of the "consti
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 tutional revolution" lay in the "disintegration" of established doctrine
 that had been "in place since the 1920s," the causal significance of the
 Great Depression as well as the New Deal must wither.
 A second thesis, also implicitly minimized, stresses the fact that
 Roosevelt reconstituted the Court with seven new appointments
 between the summer of 1937 and 1943. White readily acknowledges
 the doctrinal impact of the Roosevelt appointees, but he marginalizes
 their significance with respect to the "causal" question on two
 grounds. First, he restricts the question to a narrow time frame: did
 the New Deal pressure the "old" Court—that is, the Court prior to
 the ascension of any of Roosevelt's appointees—to repudiate any of
 its own doctrines? Given that definition of the question, the role of
 Roosevelt's appointees and of the Court's decisions after the summer
 of 1937 is simply irrelevant. Second, White portrays the subsequent
 decisions of the Roosevelt appointees as essentially extensions or
 corollaries that followed from the "disintegration" of established
 doctrine. Because those pre-existing doctrinal developments pre
 pared the way for the "constitutional revolution," the Roosevelt
 appointees, with "less of an investment" in orthodox jurisprudence,
 were "relatively free to fashion a new set of doctrinal approaches."
 White's overall "causal" thesis, then, consists of two principal
 propositions with room for two subsidiary refinements. The principal
 propositions are that the "constitutional revolution" was not caused
 by the election of 1936 or the Court-packing plan and that it was
 caused, at least primarily, by an interrelated series of doctrinal
 developments that were well underway before the coming of either
 the Great Depression or the New Deal. The first refinement is that
 broader social pressures might have influenced one or more of the
 justices but that, if they did, the influence was quite limited: limited
 because any such influence was the result of general circumstances,
 not politics (that is, any such influence arose from the general need
 to deal with the Depression and had its effect by the time of Nebbia
 in 1934, before any overt political threats had been made); and
 limited because any such influence could have affected the Court
 only because the prior doctrinal "disintegration" had opened logical
 pathways through which the Court could reach "lawful" new accom
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 modations. The second refinement is simpler. The Roosevelt appoin
 tees extended, but did not "cause," the "constitutional revolution."
 Thus the fundamental importance of White's book—and the point
 of its tighdy constrained definition of the "causal" issue—is that it
 offers a sophisticated historical explanation of the "constitutional
 revolution" while affirming the institutional integrity of the Supreme
 Court and the reality of the rule of law. On the one hand, the book
 accepts four historical propositions that challenge normative theories
 of constitutional law: that doctrine evolves continuously, if unevenly;
 that judges adapt legal doctrines to changing social circumstances;
 that judicial decisions reflect the personal values of the judges; and
 that changes in judicial personnel often change the law. On the other
 hand, the book also affirms two cornerstone propositions that support
 the ideal of constitutional government and the rule of law. One of
 those propositions is jurisprudential: that, regardless of the values of
 individual judges and the reality of doctrinal change over time,
 established legal principles, categories, and doctrines do, in fact, limit
 and channel judicial behavior. The other proposition is institutional:
 that in the 1930's, even though subject to intense pressures, neither
 the Supreme Court nor any of its justices—officials "whose very
 identity is bound up in canons of impartiality and fidelity to the
 authority of law in America"—succumbed to any type of overt
 political threat or betrayed their own established constitutional
 principles.
 The Constitution and the New Deal is thus sophisticated history
 that seeks to affirm profoundly important jurisprudential and insti
 tutional messages. It was, of course, written before the appearance of
 Bush v. Gore.
 Ill
 White's resolution of the "causal" issue sets the stage for two
 follow-up questions. One is why—if the Court's decisions in 1937
 were merely extensions of prior doctrine—contemporaries nonethe
 less perceived a "constitutional revolution." The other is why—in the
 face of overwhelming contradictory evidence—the "conventional
 account" became, and remained, so widely accepted. White's inter
 related answers are clear and sweeping.
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 His answer to the first question is that contemporaries reacted as
 they did because there was, indeed, a "constitutional revolution."
 What they experienced, however, was not a doctrinal revolution
 "caused" by the New Deal but rather a much broader transformation
 in constitutional and judicial theory. In the late 1930s and early
 1940's, White argues, the Court rejected "three core elements of
 orthodox late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century constitutional
 jurisprudence." The first was "an essentialist conception of constitu
 tional principles" that were considered rooted in the text of the
 Constitution. The second was "a theory of constitutional adaptivity"
 that understood judicial decisions—no matter how novel—as merely
 reaffirmations of the "essentialist meaning of constitutional princi
 ples." The third was what White calls "guardian review," the faith that
 in construing the Constitution judges merely marked out "preor
 dained boundaries between public power and private rights and
 between the nation and the states."
 In place of those orthodoxies the post-1937 Court substituted
 "modernist theories of legal authority and judicial interpretation."
 Modernism rejected "essentialist ideas" of pre-existing principles and
 boundaries, embraced a theory of constitutional adaptivity that
 assumed a "living Constitution" whose meaning changed over time,
 and replaced "guardian review" with "bifurcated review," a more
 overtly subjectivist practice of judging economic regulations defer
 entially while protecting civil rights and liberties aggressively. "The
 result was a constitutional revolution," White declares, "one in which
 Supreme Court justices themselves had concluded that there was no
 intelligible distinction between the authority of legal sources and that
 of their designated interpreters." It "was, fundamentally, an inter
 pretative revolution, a revolution stemming from an altered juristic
 consciousness."
 White's answer to the second follow-up question flows from his
 answer to the first. In spite of contradictory evidence, the "conven
 tional account" commanded allegiance because it symbolized the
 triumph—and authenticated the validity—of the modernism that
 brought about the true "constitutional revolution." The "triumph of
 modernist theories of the nature of law" altered the behavior of the
 Supreme Court itself and shaped the views of subsequent genera
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 tions of commentators. The inheritors of this triumphant modernism
 consequently embraced the "conventional account" because they
 cherished both the New Deal and the Court-packing plan as "vivid
 modernist symbols." The former symbolized "the formative period of
 modernist governance in America" and affirmed the modernist faith
 in the capacity of human beings to control their own destiny "through
 creative uses of government." The latter illustrated the human,
 pragmatic, and non-essentialist nature of judging. It served as "a
 symbolic affirmation of the [modernist] proposition that judges, in
 their role as constitutional interpreters, made law in the legislative
 sense."
 Thus, White's answer to the second follow-up question is straight
 forward. The "conventional account" cast its spell because later
 generations believed that the New Deal must have been able to
 control events and that the justices must have responded to political
 pressures. Their modernist assumptions demanded it.
 IV
 This truncated summary fails to do justice to the subtlety and
 complexity of The Constitution and the New Deal. It does, however,
 suggest the book's basic themes as well as its historical and intellec
 tual breadth. White succeeds admirably in his goal of "complicating"
 our ideas about the "constitutional revolution" and historicizing our
 understanding of its "conventional account." The book's aggressively
 revisionist nature will surely provoke scholars to reconsider a wide
 range of issues in 20th-century constitutional history. To start the ball
 rolling, three comments seem useful.
 A.
 One of the most striking characteristics of The Constitution and
 the New Deal is its inattention to "politics" of any kind, whether on
 the level of ideology and values, public policy proposals, elections and
 voting blocs, social and economic conflicts, or partisan tactical
 maneuvering. This absence is particularly surprising coming from a
 historian as sophisticated as White, who over the years has shown an
 acute awareness of the ways in which political, cultural, and personal
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 factors interact with legal issues. This is especially surprising, too,
 because White readily acknowledges that the true "constitutional
 revolution"—the rise and triumph of modernist consciousness—was
 not a matter of formal doctrinal change but a consequence of
 complex social dynamics.
 The absence of politics, however, means that the book leaves out
 an element essential to any understanding of the "constitutional
 revolution" as an historical phenomenon. Regardless of doctrinal
 logic and conceptual categories, liberals and conservatives alike
 heralded a "constitutional revolution" because the Court's decisions
 in 1937 were widely perceived as the culmination of a long, intense,
 and well-understood political struggle. For more than half a century
 Populists, progressives, and New Dealers had criticized the Supreme
 Court—and the entire federal judiciary—as the protector of wealth
 and property. The doctrines that White mentions, and many others
 that he does not, spurred repeated protests and shaped a vibrant
 political tradition that attacked the Court on a wide variety of
 grounds ranging from intellectual rigidity to raw social partisanship.
 Political conservatives and corporate lawyers contributed to the
 tradition by vigorously defending the Court's absolute institutional
 purity and insisting that its decisions were based on unchanging
 principles of justice and law.
 That pervasive political conflict appeared among the justices
 themselves, not only in their judicial dissents but in their private
 thoughts as well. In 1936, for example, the three "progressives" took
 deep satisfaction from the widespread public criticism that erupted
 after the Court's 5 to 4 decision invalidating a minimum wage law in
 Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo. Justice Harlan F. Stone
 gloated to Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo that "there are some doses
 too nauseous for even a hidebound conservative to swallow." Cardozo
 replied in kind. "I think we should be more than human if we failed
 to sit back in our chairs with a broad grin upon our faces." To Justice
 Louis D. Brandeis, Stone declared that the attacks were particularly
 satisfying given "the source from which they come." Even the
 staunchest conservatives were beginning to recognize "that after all
 there may be something in the protest of the so-called liberal
 minority." The criticism of Tipaldo was so vigorous, Stone informed
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 Cardozo a few weeks later, that "our brethren" in the majority were
 attempting to avoid responsibility by blaming their decision on a
 technical flaw in the appeal papers. Their purported excuse, Stone
 wrote scornfully, was "a flimsy evasion." During the mid 1930's, in
 fact, the three "progressives" caucused regularly in preparation for
 the Court's Saturday conferences. The Court's conservative justices,
 the "Four Horsemen," did the same. Not surprisingly, there seems to
 be no record of any member of either of the two groups being invited
 to the other's caucus.
 In the spring of 1937 both the standing political lines and the
 significance of the cases on the Court's docket were clear. Under
 standably, then, when the Court announced its decisions, it seemed
 to most observers—New Dealers and their adversaries alike—that
 the Court had "changed" and that the New Deal had "won." In
 context, it is not at all puzzling why legal commentators would think
 that something akin to a "constitutional revolution" had taken place,
 nor why New Dealers would happily proclaim it as such. Indeed,
 from the very beginning the label had more than a little of the
 polemical and rhetorical about it.
 Thus, the "constitutional revolution" cannot be reduced to, or fully
 understood, as either a change in formally stated doctrines or as a
 transformation in dominant legal "consciousness." Both of those
 changes were important, but the New Deal "constitutional revolu
 tion" was also a complex political transformation that included a
 variety of critical elements. One was a major realignment in the
 nation's political structure. A second was a substantial alteration in
 the roles and interrelationships of the various branches of govern
 ment. A third was a fundamental change in the Court's animating
 social and political values. The Court that refused to review hostile
 interpretations of the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act in the
 lower courts between 1932 and 1937, for example, was a Court
 inspired by different substantive values than the Court that enforced
 that statute readily and vigorously in 1938.
 Indeed, a change in the Court's substantive values was apparent in
 West Coast Hotel—the decision that White fairly terms "the very
 centerpiece" of the "conventional account." In a perceptive analysis
 White shows that Hughes's majority opinion, in spite of overruling
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 Adkins v. Children's Hospital, stayed within the formal boundaries of
 traditional "guardian review." What he passes over, however, is the
 fact that the Chief Justice's opinion also contained a truly radical
 change of view. Freedom of contract in the labor market, Hughes
 wrote, provided "what is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable
 employers." West Coast Hotel may have followed the form of
 "guardian review," in other words, but it also reflected social and
 political values that would fundamentally reshape the practical
 significance of that form.
 By ignoring political context the book also overinflates the causal
 role of "modernist theory." While changing jurisprudential ideas
 were an integral part of the "constitutional revolution," those ideas
 did not determine events and perceptions in a vacuum. Indeed,
 jurisprudential "modernism" arose in part from, and developed in
 close connection with, the tradition of political protest that indicted
 the Court for intellectual rigidity and political bias.
 Furthermore, the generations that subsequently perpetuated the
 New Deal's "triumphalist" narrative were surely responding to the
 interpretative needs of their own later political commitments as
 much or more than they were compelled by their modernist
 assumptions. Imagine the situation where scholars discovered signif
 icant evidence of a constitutional "original intent" that supported a
 right to abortion or affirmative action. Would it require a cynic to
 predict a massive passing of theoretical ships in the night between
 right and left?
 B.
 In an illuminating discussion of Senator and then Justice George
 Sutherland, White highlights a perplexing issue—the role of individ
 ual values in judicial decisionmaking. As early as 1909, White tells us,
 Sutherland as a senator set out "to revise the cast of orthodoxy" in
 constitutional foreign relations law, and his ideas proved to be "a
 singularly influential force in the transformation of' the field. Al
 though strictly orthodox in domestic constitutional law, Sutherland
 "supported aggressive, expansionist foreign policy initiatives" and
 elaborated "a theory of national foreign relations powers" that
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 bypassed constitutional limitations and rested on "inherent" powers
 of national sovereignty. The "primary thrust" of his thinking "was to
 disassociate" foreign relations powers "from the essentialist struc
 ture" of domestic "enumerated and reserved [powers] constitutional
 jurisprudence." Ultimately, as a justice in 1936, Sutherland wrote the
 Court's opinion in United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Co. where,
 with "breathtakingly broad scope and dubious use of authorities," he
 wrote his earlier theories into law. Rejecting the principles of
 orthodoxy, Sutherland's opinion conferred near absolute discretion
 on the president and ruled that "the 'inherent' foreign relations
 power of the federal government was extraconstitutional."
 White uses Sutherland's work on foreign relations law effectively
 for several purposes. First, it shows that one of the legendary "Four
 Horsemen" was neither a stereotypical reactionary nor a rigid
 "mechanical" jurist. Second, it bolsters White's "causal" argument by
 demonstrating that "some transformative doctrinal changes" were
 underway long before the New Deal. Third, it exemplifies how
 "orthodox" constitutional thinking began to change under pressure
 from "some dramatic and frightening features of modernity," in this
 instance "the increasingly expansive and foreboding character of the
 emerging twentieth-century international order." Finally, exemplify
 ing the "awkward and painful accommodation of constitutional
 orthodoxy to modernity" that later generations failed to recognize,
 Sutherland's career illustrates the bias and inadequacies of their
 "conventional account."
 As intellectual history White's analysis is compelling, but it is
 problematic as a critique of "modernist theory" or a defense of the
 rule of law. After all, it shows that Sutherland rejected established
 law and literally wrote his own personal views into the Constitution.
 That surely supports a basic "modernist" idea and complicates any
 theory of legal determinacy. Further, Sutherland's foreign relations
 jurisprudence demonstrates that he was not an "essentialist" in any
 absolute or "principled" way. Rather, he was an "essentialist" who was
 prepared to abandon "essentialism" as well as limited government
 when he saw a good reason to do so. Thus in his case, at least,
 "orthodoxy" and "essentialism" seem to represent something far
 more complex—and far more socially, politically, and individually
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 rooted—than an established and controlling legal "epistemology."
 Finally, Sutherland's behavior raises a basic question. Why did he
 abandon "essentialism" in foreign relations law but remain rigidly
 orthodox in domestic law? Clearly, a satisfactory explanation for the
 difference cannot rest on either the absence of modernist pressures
 on domestic constitutional law or Sutherland's simple fidelity to
 orthodox doctrine and faith in the unalterable principles inherent in
 the Constitution.
 Indeed, Sutherland's abandonment of constitutional limitations
 and his embrace of "inherent" sovereign powers brings to mind the
 parallel behavior of another of the Court's legendary "anti
 progressives," Justice David J. Brewer. Rejecting the idea of "inher
 ent" power as a justification for executive and legislative action,
 Brewer readily embraced the idea to justify the judicial power used
 to crush the Pullman Strike of 1894. Like Sutherland, Brewer was
 also an exponent of an unchanging Constitution, jurisprudential
 essentialism, and judicially-enforced limitations on government. He
 was also—again like Sutherland—a willing instrumentalist dans les
 grandes occasions.
 The careers of Sutherland and Brewer highlight the unavoidable,
 if variously constrained, role that individual and personal factors play
 in constitutional law. For his part, Brewer readily accepted that truth.
 A judge, he insisted, must be prepared to "assert his convictions of
 right and wrong." Dissenting in West Coast Hotel, Sutherland
 acknowledged a similar understanding. "The check upon the judge,"
 he declared, "is that imposed by his oath of office, by the Constitution
 and by his own conscientious and informed convictions."
 The important conclusion is not that Brewer and Sutherland were
 bad people, or bad judges, or even unusual judges. Rather, it is that
 they were not only judges but judges on a most unusual court—a
 court shaped by a long and complex process of institutional evolu
 tion—that has come to address issues that often allow and sometimes
 compel both "instrumentalist" responses and recourse to personal
 "convictions." Nor is the conclusion either that they were always and
 simply "instrumentalists" or that they faced no constraints from
 inherited legal doctrines and concepts. Rather, the point is that on
 various issues and on various occasions they had varying amounts of
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 discretion which they used in varying ways, depending in varying
 degrees on their own varying values and perceptions at different
 historical moments. Such a conclusion must surely be deeply unsat
 isfying for stereotypical "traditionalists" and "behavioralists" alike.
 That generality, nonetheless, is one of the lessons of the historian's
 judicial history.
 That truth suggests one of the limits—and it is a limit, not a
 refutation—of White's "doctrinal disintegration" thesis. The mere
 fact that doctrinal evolution had opened new pathways neither
 required any of the justices to trod them nor specified when, to what
 extent, and for what purposes they were to be followed. At any point
 in time justices have a wide variety of premises, logics, shadings, and
 distinctions—legal and factual—available to shift in varying degrees
 the vectors of constitutional interpretation. Few cases reach the
 United States Supreme Court without plausible arguments on at least
 two, if not more, different sides. Thus, "doctrinal disintegration"
 could be but one of the factors that "caused" the "constitutional
 revolution."
 Those thoughts suggest, finally, that White's focus on the evolution
 of formal doctrine leads him to overlook what might be a critical
 factor in the "constitutional revolution." Much of the entire contro
 versy stemmed from the performance of one person, Justice Owen J.
 Roberts, the ultimate "swing" justice. Scholars have generally seen
 Roberts as wanting in self-confidence, lacking a well-considered
 constitutional jurisprudence, and susceptible to the influence of
 other justices and, perhaps, to outside pressures as well. Roberts
 himself acknowledged his own disappointment with his judicial
 performance. Had his seat been filled by another, the constitutional
 history of the 1930's would likely have been quite different, perhaps
 even without a "constitutional revolution" of any type.
 While a "weak justice" thesis seems plausible, it also appears to be •
 unacceptable to many. Foundational issues—the practice of consti
 tutional government and the rule of law—are at stake, and it seems
 unsatisfying to explain something as spectacular as a "constitutional
 revolution" as the consequence of a single uncertain and vascillating
 individual. We reject such an interpretation, perhaps, for the same
 reason that many people reject the idea that a crazed individual,
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 acting entirely alone, could assassinate a president of the United
 States. It could, nonetheless, be true.
 C.
 White's book is also a broad-guaged assault on a certain kind of
 constitutional history that has gained prominence in the past two
 decades. In particular, White attacks the work of law professors Cass
 Sunstein and Bruce Ackerman for attempting to meet the challenge
 of Reagan "originalism" by manipulating historical materials to serve
 the purposes of contemporary modernist liberalism. In addition, to
 broaden his thesis, White also criticizes the work of historian Laura
 Kaiman, who has been sympathetic toward Ackerman's work and,
 according to White, produced "another reconstructed version of the
 conventional account." Clinging to the view that judges are merely
 political actors, her work "suggests that the most fundamental
 challenge to the conventional account of American constitutional
 histoiy may be one directed toward its modernist-inspired, behav
 ioralist assumptions about constitutional law and judging."
 With respect to Sunstein and Ackerman, White's comments seem
 fair if incomplete. Ackerman's work is overtly "theoretical," while
 Sunstein has acknowledged his search for "a useable past." Their
 politics, purposes, and strategies are hardly secret. What White
 leaves out in his effort to historicize their work, however, is a
 discussion of the "originalist" campaign—equally partisan and prob
 lematic—which prompted their efforts. If judges and scholars accept
 lawyered history, then Sunstein and Ackerman can be blamed for
 little more than playing the game. If they are to be historicized, the
 work that provoked them should be treated similarly.
 In fairness, White may intend—though implicitly and indirect
 ly—to do just that. In an intriguing chapter he traces the growing use
 of the term "substantive due process" from 1938 through the late
 20th century, suggesting that the term served the conscious and
 unconscious purposes of commentators and distorted the nature of
 early 20th-century constitutional jurisprudence. Thus, his analysis
 suggests some of the uncertainties and dangers inherent in efforts to
 unearth any "original intent." One is that researchers who serve
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 contemporary purposes and seek forensic leverage transform the
 quest from the merely daunting to the intrinsically dubious. Another
 is that the denotations and connotations in our luxuriant vocabularies
 change, and the passing years pile layer upon layer of meaning onto
 the words and concepts we use. Without careful attention to the
 individual history of each, we cannot recapture the "lost attitude
 toward constitutional interpretation" that marked a prior age.
 Thus, White seems to suggest that when researchers seek a
 directive "original intent" from a time further removed than the early
 20th century, they are even more likely to produce mere confirma
 tions of their contemporary views. There are, he insists, "striking
 perceptual differences" between the current generation and those
 who lived through the "constitutional revolution." By underscoring
 substantial "perceptual differences" between generations which lived
 a mere 65 years apart, he implies that contemporary commentators
 who seek a more distant "original intent" have embarked on a
 particularly hazardous and suspect enterprise. As he wisely warns
 against liberal efforts to schematize the New Deal for contemporary
 purposes, he seems to warn equally, if less overtly, against conserva
 tive efforts to find "answers" to current problems in any more
 distanced "original intent."
 With respect to Kaiman, White's comments stand on a somewhat
 different footing. Acknowledging her own political views, Kaiman has
 struggled openly with complex historical materials. The fact that she
 stresses "the deeply behavioral character of judging"—especially in
 considering the events of the 1930's—hardly provides a basis for
 inferring that she rejects all claims that legal materials may play
 causal roles in shaping judicial decisions. Nor does it provide a basis
 for concluding that she equates such claims with a "revival of an
 older, unreflective caricature of judging as an apolitical process."
 Ironically, White's discussion of Kalman's work highlights the
 unresolved issue that lies at the heart of The Constitution and the
 New Deal: the role of legal materials in shaping judicial decisions.
 The book stresses that a dominant modernist "behavioralism" has
 inculcated the belief that judicial decisions are nothing but ordinary
 political actions and that modernism has consequently created a
 "large hole" in the middle of "the conventional account." That hole,
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 White insists, "can only be filled by close analysis of the world of early
 twentieth-centuiy constitutional doctrines, categories, and analo
 gies." A fair enough hypothesis. Rehavioralists apparently exist, and
 the "constitutional revolution" seems for them an ideal nesting spot.
 But the real historical question about the causal role of legal
 doctrines and concepts is not a general one. Few knowledgeable
 scholars would suggest that legal concepts and doctrines never have
 causal significance, and fewer still would claim that they always have
 such force. Insofar as the question can ever be answered clearly and
 convincingly, it can only be answered for specific times, places,
 issues, courts, and judges.
 As a sophisticated lawyer and historian, White seems to acknowl
 edge that conclusion. His goal, he tells us, is only to complicate
 history by insisting that legal doctrines and concepts have some causal
 significance. Indeed, he notes that "traditional" judicial decisionmak
 ing in the early 20th century was "not fully consistent" with essen
 tialism and that "guardian review" itself was "seemingly designed to
 give judges a fair amount of latitude." Moreover, he readily admits
 that "changes in constitutional law doctrines have been habitual in
 the history of the Court." In fact, White offers that last proposition as
 a reason for testing the "causal" impact of the Court-packing plan
 solely by events in the first half of 1937. "If the time frame is
 broadened," he explains, "adherents of the Court-packing thesis are
 able to contrast a fairly large sample of pre-1937 decisions with
 several post-1937 decisions, illustrating changes in constitutional
 doctrine." But establishing substantial change in a broadened time
 frame would not prove any special "revolution" because "that sort of
 exercise can be undertaken, if a sufficient time interval is employed,
 for any period in the Court's history."
 Ultimately, then, the broader argument of The Constitution and
 the New Deal is ironic. There was no New Deal "constitutional
 revolution" because constitutional law was, and continues to be, a
 constantly evolving phonemenon.
 More striking, the book never actually shows that legal doctrines
 and concepts did, in fact, "cause" any judicial decision. Indeed,
 insofar as it identifies "doctrinal disintegration" as a causal factor in
 the "constitutional revolution," its argument would seem to imply a
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 dominant causal role for other, unspecified non-doctrinal factors.
 After all, if doctrine was disintegrating, how could it have the power
 to "cause" constitutional changes? Did disintegration not mean,
 rather, that doctrine necessarily declined in significance and thereby
 allowed wider play to substantive values and assumptions different
 from those that were embedded in the crumbling orthodoxy?
 Such questions are the inevitable fruit of a book as ambitious and
 provocative as The Constitution and the New Deal. We are in White's
 debt for challenging us to rethink some of the broadest and most
 fundamental issues in American constitutional law and history.
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